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f?ECIENT DIEVlEtOPf1/NENTS

Butler v. State:
COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL DOES
NOT PRECLUDE
STATE FROM
RETRYING
DEFENDANT ON
COUNTS UPON
WHICH JURY
DEADLOCKED
AT DEFENDANT'S
FORMER TRIAL.

In an opinion which reviewed the intricate doctrines
of collateral estoppel and double jeopardy, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recently held
that collateral estoppel does not
preclude the State from retrying
a defendant on counts upon
which the jury deadlocked at his
former trial. In Butler v. State,
335 Md. 238, 643 A.2d 389
(1994), the court of appeals
ruled that a defendant's acquittal of second degree murder of
one victim does not specifically
prohibit the State from retrying
him on charges relating to assault with intent to murder another victim.
In an eight-count indictment, defendant Michael Butler
("Butler") was charged with,
inter alia, murder and accessory after the fact in the shooting
death of Sherman Chenault
("Chenault") and assault with
intent to murder Sharre1l
Hudson ("Hudson"). Witness
testimony revealed that the attack on Chenault and Hudson
occurred following the consummation of a failed drug deal and
that
Kent
Tilghman
("Tilghman") was the principal
in Chenault's murder.
Butler was tried by a
jury in the Circuit Court for
Howard County. The jury returned verdicts of not guilty of
second degree murder of
Chenault and guilty of accessory after the fact to the murder of
Chenault. However, the jury
deadlocked on the charges of
first degree murder ofChenault,
use of a handgun in the murder
of Chenault, and four charges

relating to the attack on Hudson.
When the State indicated its intention to retry Butler on the
remaining six charges, Butler
filed a motion to dismiss, maintaining that double jeopardy and
collateral estoppel principles
precluded such a retrial. Although the trial judge determined the unresolved charges
relating to Chenault were barred
by double jeopardy, the court
ruled that the State could retry
Butler on the charges concerning the assault on Hudson. In a
thorough analysis of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the
Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed the decision
of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted
Butler's writ of certiorari to determine if collateral estoppel
barred the State from retrying
Butler and affirmed the decision
of the court of special appeals.
The court of appeals
began its discussion with an
analysis ofthe principles ofdouble jeopardy and collateral estoppel. First, the court noted
that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment
is applicable to the states as part
ofthe Due Process Clause ofthe
Fourteenth Amendment. Butler, 335Md. at 252, 643 A.2dat
396 (citation omitted). The
court further stated that the
doctrine ofcollateral estoppel is
embodied within the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against
double jeopardy and, as such, is
an established component of
Maryland's common law. Id. at
253,643 A.2d at 396 (citations
omitted).
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In short, the court indicated that when an issue ofultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, collateral estoppel bars
the relitigation of the same issues between the same parties in
any future lawsuit. Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, the
court explained that although
collateral estoppel is usually invoked based upon a prior acquittal, the critical consideration
is whether an issue of ultimate
fact has been previously determined in favor ofthe defendant.
Id. (citations omitted). Finally,
the court noted that the burden
of proof remains on the party
asserting estoppel to show that
"the issue whose relitigation he
seeks to foreclo,se was actually
decided in the first proceeding."
Id. at 254, 643 A.2d at 396
(citations omitted).
Applying the aforementioned principles to the instant
case, the court of appeals flatly
rejected Butler's contention that
collateral estoppel precluded the
State from retrying him on the
counts pertaining to the attack
on Hudson. Id. at 255, 643
A.2d at 397. Specifically, the
court emphasized that Butler's
conviction of accessory after
the fact for the murder of
Chenault was not, as a matter of
law, inconsistent with convictions for aiding and abetting in
the shooting of Hudson. Id.
The court noted that Butler's
case predated the abrogation of
the common law rule that a defendant could not legally be both
an accessory after the fact and a
principal to the same substan-

tive felony, and furtherreasoned
that Butler was not charged with
being an accessory after the fact
in any of the counts relating to
Hudson. Id. Thus, the court
determined that Butler could not
avoid retrial based on the old
common law rule that accessories after the fact cannot also be
principals in the same crime because the murder of Chenault
and the assault with intent to
murder Hudson were different
felonies. Id.
The court similarly rejected Butler's contention that
an accessory after the fact conviction is factually inconsistent
with a finding that he aided and
abetted in the shooting of
Hudson. Id. at 256,642 A.2d at
397. The court stated that where
a jury is not clearly instructed to
the contrary, a person could be
found factually guilty of being a
principal in the second degree
by aiding and abetting, as well
as guilty of being an accessory
after the fact. Id. Accordingly,
a jury could reasonably have
found that Butler drove
Tilghman from the murder scene
and plotted with Tilghman to
commit the crimes for which he
was later charged. Id. at 257,
643 Md. at 398.
Additionally, the court
rejected Butler's implication of
the doctrine of mutual exclusivity. In further support of his
collateral estoppel challenge,
Butler argued that because of
mutual exclusivity, collateral
estoppel can be predicated upon
a guilty verdict as to one crime,
which, in tum, operates as a not
guilty verdict as to another

crime. Disregarding this argument, the court noted that although collateral estoppel
barred the State from convicting Butler as an accessory after
the fact to Chenault's murder
and the legally inconsistent crime
of being an aider and abettor to
the same murder, the State was
not barred from retrying Butler
for the "legally consistent"
crime of aiding and abetting in
the shooting of Hudson. Id. at
259, 643 A.2d at 399.
The court concluded
that although the jury acquitted
Butler of second degree murder
of Chenault, it did not necessarily find that Butler had no intent
to kill Hudson. Id. at 271,643
A.2d at 405. The court stated
that it was possible that the jury
found Tilghman's shooting of
Chenault was clearly first degree premeditated murder and
deadlocked on whether Butler
aided and abetted in that murder. Id. Accepting the trial
judge's instruction that second
degree murder does not involve
premeditation or deliberation
and his instruction that each
count must be weighed separately, the court of appeals held
that Chenault's acquittal for second degree murder was not inconsistent with a determination
that there was a premeditated
and deliberate plan to kill
Hudson. Id. Furthermore, the
court determined that the jury
neither found that Butler knowingly participated in that plan,
nor found that he was an innocent participant. Id. In light of
the jury's determination that
Butler was not a principal in any
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of the crimes for which he was
charged, the court held that the
State was free to retry him on the
counts relating to the assault on
Hudson.
In holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel will
not bar retrial of unresolved issues, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland articulated that where
a trial involves the same crime

but different victims, a defendant may ultimately be convicted of being both an accessory
after the fact as to one victim,
and a principal as to another
victim. This unjust and unduly
restrictive holding indicates that
if a defendant's conduct as to
two victims is identical, the defendant may nevertheless be retried because one victim died

and one survived. While defendants already carry the onerous
burden of proving that the jury's verdict in the first trial precludes relitigation of a particular factual issue in a second trial,
this case severely limits the availability of collateral estoppel in
criminal prosecutions.
- Kimberly C. Foreman
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